We develop multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi for the fifteen logics of the intuitionistic modal cube between IK and IS5. The proof of cut-free completeness for all logics is provided both syntactically via a Maehara-style translation and semantically by constructing an infinite birelational countermodel from a failed proof search. Interestingly, the Maehara-style translation for proving soundness syntactically fails due to the hierarchical structure of nested sequents. Consequently, we only provide the semantic proof of soundness. The countermodel construction used to prove completeness required a completely novel approach to deal with two independent sources of nontermination in the proof search present in the case of transitive and Euclidean logics.
restrict the succedent to (no more than) one formula. Gentzen [2] himself obtained this as a natural consequence of the natural deduction presentation, which has only one conclusion. In effect, the ability to have several formulas in the succedent was an additional feature introduced by Gentzen to incorporate the principle of the excluded middle. Despite this near-consensus, a multi-conclusion sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional (and predicate) logic is almost as old as Gentzen's LI. It was proposed by Maehara [3] as the auxiliary calculus L'J used to translate intuitionistic reasoning into classical one. It is hard to divine Maehara's thinking: the terse language of results, the whole results, and nothing but results was much in vogue at the time. But on the face of it, his system amounts to an observation that most classical sequent rules remain valid intuitionistically, with only a couple of propositional rules requiring the singleton-succedent restriction in the intuitionistic case. Thus, the blanket restriction of succedent to (at most) singleton sets can be seen as an overreaction. Even the interpretation of the succedent as the disjunction of its formulas is retained in Maehara's calculus.
One possible criticism of this calculus could be that it was introduced as an auxiliary, artificial construct bridging the gap between the natural(-deduction) inspired LI and the fully symmetric LK. This criticism is, however, unfounded. It has been noted (see, for instance, the excellent in-depth survey of various intuitionistic calculi by Dyckhoff [4] ) that Maehara's calculus is essentially a notational variant of tableaux from Fitting's Ph.D. thesis [5] (which Fitting himself attributes to Beth [6] ). In fact, the same system can be found in [7] and, according to von Plato [1] , a similar system was considered by Gentzen himself.
In other words, this calculus is quite natural, has been discovered by several researchers independently, and has a distinction of correlating with the semantic presentation of intuitionistic reasoning much better than LI. Indeed, tableau rules are typically read from the semantics, and Beth-Fitting's destructive tableaux match intuitionistic Kripke models perfectly. It should also be noted that Egly and Schmitt [8] demonstrated that LI cannot polynomially simulate Maehara's calculus, meaning that the latter is more efficient with respect to proof search.
The idea of extending intuitionistic reasoning with modalities is equally natural but less straightforward. There have been multiple approaches over the years with each classical modal logic receiving several alternative intuitionizations. We refer the reader to Simpson's Ph.D. [9] for the discussion of these approaches and concentrate on what eventually became officially known as intuitionistic modal logics. Similar to their classical counterparts, one can talk about the intuitionistic modal cube consisting of 15 logics. And similar to their classical brethren, ordinary sequent systems seem inadequate to describe these logics, but nested sequent systems [10] [11] [12] exist for all of them [13] . A nested sequent is a tree of ordinary sequents, referred to as sequent nodes. The tableau analog of nested sequents is prefixed tableaux [14] , the underlying idea being that the tree structure of a sequent is homomorphically mapped into the accessibility structure of a Kripke model.
To our knowledge, all nested sequent calculi for these intuitionistic modal logics that have been published so far [13, 15, 16] are globally single-conclusion: exactly one of the sequent nodes is allowed to have a non-empty succedent, and it contains exactly one formula. 2 One can say that they are the modalizations of LI in the sense that the propositional rules are local and identical to those in LI if the rest of the nested structure is ignored. The goal of this paper is to construct a modalization of the Maehara-style calculus with propositional rules conforming to the birelational semantics of intuitionistic modal logics. We formulate the calculi for the 15 intuitionistic modal logics and prove their completeness in two alternative ways:
1. by a syntactic translation from the single-conclusion calculi of [13] and 2. by a direct semantic proof of cut admissibility.
The syntactic-translation method originally employed by Maehara in [3] for translating from multi-conclusion systems to single-conclusion systems is not applicable in the setting of nested sequents because formulas in the succedent of the sequent can occur in various places in the nested sequent tree, and there is no immediate equivalence to their disjunction as it is the case with ordinary sequents. Also the method by [8] that is based on rule permutations does not work in our case, again, because the formulas in the succedent do not necessarily occur in the same sequent node. For this reason, we prove soundness for our multi-conclusion systems by a direct semantic argument.
This paper is organized as follows. First, in Sect. 2 we recall the syntax and semantics of intuitionistic modal logics. In Sect. 3, we present our nested sequent systems and show completeness of the multi-conclusion systems by using completeness of the single-conclusion systems demonstrated in [13] . Then we show semantically in Sect. 4 the soundness of the multi-conclusion systems and, finally, in Sect. 5, we give a semantic argument for the completeness of the multi-conclusion systems with respect to the birelational Kripke models.
Syntax and semantics of intuitionistic modal logics
Definition 2.1 (Language of intuitionistic modal logic) We start from a countable set A of propositional variables (or atoms). Then the set M of formulas of intuitionistic modal logic (IML) is generated by the grammar 
, and Note that in the classical case the axioms k 2 -k 5 from (1) would follow from k 1 , but due to the lack of De Morgan duality, this is not the case in intuitionistic logic.
This variant of IK that contains all 5 axioms k 1 -k 5 has first been studied in [20, 21] and investigated in detail in [9] . There exist other intuitionistic variants of K, e.g., [22] [23] [24] [25] , the most prominent being the one which has only the axioms k 1 and k 2 from (1). There is now consensus in the literature to call this variant constructive modal logic, e.g., [18, 26, 27] .
Besides the axioms (1) we also consider the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 shown in the left column of Fig. 1 . By adding a subset of these five axioms, we can a priori define 32 different logics. But some of them coincide, and we get (as in the classical case) only 15 different logics, which can be organized in the intuitionistic version of the "modal cube" [28] shown in Fig. 2 . Definition 2.3 (Logics IK +X ) For any X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, the logic IK +X is obtained from IK by adding all axioms in X . We typically simplify the name of the logic by dropping the plus and capitalizing the names of axioms that are letters. For example, the logic ID45 in Fig. 2 is IK + {d, 4, 5}. Additionally, IS4 := IK + {t, 4} and IS5 := IK + {t, 4, 5}. We write IK + X A to state that A is a theorem of IK + X .
Let us now recall the birelational models [21, 29] for intuitionistic modal logics, which are a combination of the Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic and for classical modal logic. 
If we collapse the relation ≤ by letting w ≤ v iff w = v we obtain the standard Kripke models for classical modal logics.
Nested sequents for modal logics
Ordinary one-sided sequents are usually multisets of formulas separated by commas:
The intended meaning of such a sequent is given by its corresponding formula
Ordinary two-sided sequents are pairs of such multisets of formulas usually separated by the sequent arrow ⇒. The corresponding formula of a two-sided sequent
is the formula
In their original formulation for classical modal logics [10, 11] , nested sequents are a generalization of ordinary one-sided sequents: a nested sequent is a tree whose nodes are multisets of formulas. More precisely, it is of the form
where A 1 , …, A n are formulas and 1 , …, m are nested sequents. The corresponding formula for the sequent in (5) in the classical case is
where fm( i ) is the corresponding formula of i for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. In the following, we just write sequent for nested sequent. 
The depth of a sequent is defined to be the depth of its tree.
For capturing intuitionistic logic, we need "two-sided" nested sequents. For this, we follow [13] and assign each formula in the nested sequent a unique polarity that can be either • for input/left polarity (representing "being in the antecedent of the sequent" or "on the left of the sequent arrow, if there were a sequent arrow"), and • for output/right polarity (representing "being in the succedent of the sequent" or "on the right of the sequent arrow, if there were a sequent arrow"). In a classical setting, the corresponding formula of (7) is simply
However, in the intuitionistic setting, the situation is not as simple. The systems presented in [13, 15, 16 ] follow Gentzen's idea of having exactly one formula of output polarity in the sequent. Such a sequent is generated by the grammar Definition 3.3 (Single-conclusion two-sided nested sequent)
In (9), stands for a sequent that contains only formulas with input polarity, and for a sequent that contains exactly one formula with output polarity. The corresponding formula of a sequent in (9) is defined as follows: 
Note that the corresponding formula for a single-conclusion sequent significantly depends on the position of the output formula. Moving this formula to a different node drastically changes the corresponding formula. Thus, there is no natural way to generalize this to the multi-conclusion case, and unfortunately, it seems that no such formula exists. For this reason, in the next section we provide an alternative definition of validity for multi-conclusion sequents.
The next step is to show the inference rules. But before we can do so, we need to introduce an additional notation. Definition 3.5 (Multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi NKK + X for classical modal logics) Figure 3 shows the system for the classical modal logic K, which is just the two-sided version of Brünnler's system [11] (see also [15] ), extended with the rules for ⊥ and ⊃. 3 Then, Fig. 4 shows the rules for the axioms d, t, b, 4, and 5 from Fig. 1 . For X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5} we write X • and X • to be the corresponding subsets of {d
Then we write
As usual, we denote derivability in these and other nested sequent calculi by using . Before we can state soundness and completeness for the classical system, we need the notion of 45-closure due to Brünnler [11] , which is needed for completeness. 
The 45-closure of X , denoted byX , is the smallest 45-closed set that contains X . Theorem 3.7 (Brünnler [11] ) For a 45-closed set X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, the system NKK+ X is sound and complete w.r.t. the classical modal logic K extended with the axioms X .
We can now straightforwardly obtain an intuitionistic variant of the system NKK by demanding that each sequent occurring in a proof contains exactly one output formula. Note that almost all rules in Figs. 1 and 3 preserve this property when going from conclusion to premise, and can therefore remain unchanged. There are only two rules that violate this condition: c • and ⊃ • . We therefore forbid the use of c • and change ⊃ • in that we delete the old output formula in the left premise. 
In a similar way we can define NKK+X'.
Theorem 3.9 (Straßburger, [13] ) For a 45-closed set X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}, NIKs+X' is sound and complete w.r.t. the intuitionistic modal logic IK + X . 4 The proof in [13] is done via cut elimination where the cut rule is shown on the left below:
The variant of the cut rule on the right above is the version for the systems without the restriction of having only one output formula in a sequent. This brings us to the actual purpose of this paper: multiple-conclusion systems for the logics IK + X , in the style of Maehara [3] . In all these systems, the weakening rule
is depth-preserving admissible: Lemma 3.11 (dp-admissibility of weakening) Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5}. Then the weakening rule w is depth-preserving admissible in NKK +X , in NIKs+X , and in NIKm+X , i.e., if {∅} has a proof, then { } has a proof of at most the same depth.
Proof The proof is a straightforward induction on the depth of the derivation (see [11] for details). 
Note that the first transition is by weakening, which is admissible in all our systems by Lemma 3.11, and that the proviso for both applications of 5 • in the transformed derivation is satisfied whenever it is satisfied in the original derivation.
Remark 3.13
As observed by Marin [30] , Lemma 3.12 fails to hold for NIKs+X because of the absence of c • . Below is an example of a derivation from which
In all systems presented so far, the identity rule id is restricted to atomic formulas, but the general form is derivable. Proposition 3.14 (Non-atomic initial sequents) For every formula A and every appropriate context { }, the sequent
is derivable in NKK, in NIKs, and in NIKm.
Proof By a straightforward induction on A.
Remark 3.15
The appropriateness of the context only plays a role for NIKs, where { } is not allowed to contain output formulas.
Maehara shows [3] the equivalence of his multiple conclusion system to Gentzen's single conclusion system from [2] by translating a multiple conclusion sequent into a single conclusion sequent whereby the multiple formulas on the right are replaced by one, their disjunction. This is not possible in the nested sequent setting because "the formulas on the right" are generally scattered all over the sequent tree.
However, one direction is straightforward:
Theorem 3.16 (Translation from single-to multi-conclusion) Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5} and be a single-conclusion sequent.
Proof The only rule in NIKs + X (resp. NIKs+X') that is not an instance of a rule in NIKm + X (resp. NIKm+X') is ⊃ • s . But it can be derived using ⊃ • and weakening. Thus, the theorem follows from Lemma 3.11. Proof This follows immediately from Theorem 3.16 using Lemma 3.12.
Note that in Corollary 3.17, it is implicitly assumed that the sequent has exactly one output formula because otherwise it could not be the endsequent of a correct derivation in NIKs+X or NIKs+X'. Corollary 3.18 (Formula-level completeness of NIKm+X and NIKm+X') For a 45-closed set X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5},
Proof If B is X -valid, then B • is derivable in NIKs+X' by Theorem 3.9. Thus, B • is derivable both in NIKm+X and in NIKm+X' by Corollary 3.17.
Semantic proof of soundness
In this section we show that every rule in NIKm+X is sound with respect to X -models. For this, we first have to extend the notion of validity from formulas to sequents. 
If is not satisfied by f , it is refuted by it.
Remark 4.3
This definition works for both single-and multi-conclusion sequents. 
Proof This follows immediately from the definition of validity. Proof We prove the contrapositive: if is X -refutable, then NIKm + X does not prove . To demonstrate this, it is sufficient to show that, whenever the conclusion of a rule from NIKm + X is X -refutable, then so is at least one of the premises of this rule.
Let M = W , ≤, R, V be an arbitrary X -model and f be an arbitrary M-map for the conclusion of a given rule. Let γ ∈ be the node with the hole of this rule. Since the model M is never modified, we omit its mentions in this proof. Note that an M-map refutes a sequent iff it maps its nodes into worlds of M in a way that makes all input formulas forced and all output formulas not forced.
Initial sequents. The statement is vacuously true for ⊥ • and id because neither {⊥ • } nor {a • , a • } can be refuted in any birelational model.
Local propositional rules
Since propositional rules (including contraction rules) are local in that they act within one node of the sequent tree, the node we called γ , the proof for them is analogous to the case of propositional intuitionistic logic. Namely, for all propositional rules except ⊃ • m , for any birelational model M, any M-map refuting the conclusion must refute one of the premises. Consider, for instance, an instance of the rule ∨ • and an M-map f that refutes its conclusion {A ∨ B • }. In particular, it forces all input formulas from { }, forces none of output formulas from { } (each formula at the world assigned by f ), and satisfies f (γ ) A ∨ B. For the latter to happen, either f (γ ) A, making f refute the left premise {A • }, or f (γ ) B, in which case it is the right premise {B • } that is refuted by f .
Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion of the rule
are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds, in particular, f (γ ) B⊃C. Then there exists a world w ≥ f (γ ) where w B and w C. It is easy to show using (F1) and (F2) that there exists another M-map g for the conclusion such that g(γ ) = w and g(δ) ≥ f (δ) for each node δ ∈ {B ⊃C • }. By monotonicity (Proposition 2.5), all input formulas in the conclusion are also forced by g in their respective worlds. Since additionally g(γ ) B and g(γ ) C, it follows that in the premise all input formulas are forced and the only output formula, C, is not forced by g in their respective worlds. Thus, the constructed g refutes the premise in the same model.
• , and 5 • . Although these rules are not local in that they affect two nodes of the sequent tree, their treatment is much the same as that of propositional rules: any M-map refuting the conclusion must also refute the premise. Consider, for instance,
Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds of a transitive model M, in particular, f (γ ) ♦A. Let δ be the node corresponding to the displayed bracket.
Note that f (γ )R f (δ).
Consider any world w such that f (δ)Rw. Then, by transitivity, f (γ )Rw and w A. We have shown that w A whenever f (δ)Rw. Thus, f (δ) ♦A, which is sufficient to demonstrate that f refutes the premise of the rule. We also show the argument for
Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds of a Euclidean model M, in particular, f (γ ) ♦A for the displayed ♦A in the conclusion (here γ is node with the hole containing the principle formula). Let δ be the node containing the other hole and ρ be the root of the sequent tree. Then f (ρ)R k f (γ ) and f (ρ)R l f (δ) for some k, l ≥ 0. Moreover, the proviso for the rule demands that k > 0. Consider any world w such that f (δ)Rw. Then both f (γ ) and w are accessible from f (ρ) in one or more R steps. It is an easy corollary of Euclideanity that f (γ )Rw, meaning that w A. We have shown that w A whenever f (δ)Rw. Thus, f (δ) ♦A, which is sufficient to demonstrate that f refutes the premise of the rule.
Rules 4 • and 5 • are similar in nature but require an additional consideration in the proof. We explain it on the example of
As in the case of 4 • , we deal with two nodes: parent γ and its child δ, the latter corresponding to the displayed bracket. We assume that f (γ ) A and need to show that f (δ) A. The difference lies in the fact that apart from worlds accessible from f (δ) itself, as in the case of 4 • , we have to consider also worlds accessible from futures of f (δ) . However, the condition (F1) and transitivity ensure that any world accessible from a future of f (δ) is also accessible from some future of f (γ ) making it possible to apply the assumption.
Rules ♦ • , d
• , and d
• . All these rules are similar to the majority of modal rules, except for the fact that one needs to choose a new world for the premise. For rules d
this world is chosen as any world accessible from f (γ ) by seriality. For the rule ♦ • , the assumption is that ♦A is forced at f (γ ), which implies that there exists an accessible world forcing A, and it is this world that is chosen for the extra node in the sequent tree of the premise. Consider, e.g., an instance of ♦ • and assume that f refutes its conclusion {♦A • }. In particular, f (γ ) ♦A. Thus, there exists a world w ∈ W such that f (γ )Rw and w A. We define an M-map g for the premise {[A • ]} to act like f on all nodes that are present in the conclusion and to map the node δ corresponding to the displayed bracket to w. Then, just like f , the map g forces all input formulas in { } and none of output formulas in { } and, in addition, g (δ) A, meaning that g refutes the premise.
Rule •
m . Assume that all input formulas in the conclusion of the rule
are forced and all output formulas are not forced by an M-map f in their respective worlds, in particular, f (γ ) A. Then there exist worlds u and w such that u ≥ f (γ ), and u Rw, and w A. It is easy to show using (F1) and (F2) that there exists an Mmap g for the premise such that g(γ ) = u, g(δ) = w for the node δ present in the premise but not in the conclusion, and g(ϑ) ≥ f (ϑ) for each node ϑ ∈ { A • }. By monotonicity (Proposition 2.5), all input formulas in the conclusion are also forced by g in their respective worlds. Since additionally g (δ) A, it follows that in the premise all input formulas are forced and the only output formula, A, is not forced by g in their respective worlds. Thus, the constructed g refutes the premise in the same model. This completes the proof of soundness.
Semantic proof of completeness
In this section we show the completeness of our multiple conclusion systems semantically. To simplify the argument, we work with a modified system cNIKm+X', that is defined as follows. For every inference rule in NIKm+X (and NIKm+X'), except for ⊃ • m and • m , we can define its contraction variant, denoted by the subscript c, that keeps the principal formula of the conclusion in all premises. Below are three examples: Proof Every rule r c is derivable via r and c • or c • , and conversely, every rule r is derivable from r c and w. Hence, the statement follows from Lemmas 3.11 and 3.12.
We can now state the completeness theorem:
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness) Let X ⊆ {d, t, b, 4, 5} be a 45-closed set, and let ϒ be a sequent.
Remark 5.4
Note that this is stronger than the completeness result proved syntactically in Corollary 3.18 which was formulated for single formulas rather than arbitrary sequents. While the argument used to prove Corollary 3.18 extends as is to single-conclusion sequents, the result in this section shows completeness for all multi-conclusion sequents.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 5.3, and we let X and ϒ be fixed. We prove the contrapositive: if NIKm + X ϒ, then ϒ is X -refutable. By Lemma 5.2 we can work with the system cNIKm+X', which is equivalent to NIKm + X . We work with the (almost) complete proof search tree T in cNIKm+X' that is constructed as follows: the nodes of T are sequents, and the root of T is the endsequent ϒ. For each possible unary rule application r to a sequent in T the premise of r is a child of in T, and for each possible binary rule application to , both premises of r are children of in T. (Recall that we mean here upward rule applications.) There are only two exceptions to prevent the creation of infinitely many redundant children: along each branch of the proof search tree The countermodel that we are going to construct will be based on the tree T that is obtained from T by removing all subtrees that have derivable sequents as roots. In the following, we use , , etc. to denote sequent occurrences in T rather than sequents.
The method we use is a modification of the one used for classical modal logics to the case of infinite proof-search tree. Ordinarily, a proof-search tree used to construct a countermodel is obtained by postponing non-invertible rules as long as possible. In other words, a non-invertible rule is only to be used after the sequent is completely saturated by all the applicable invertible rules. Saturated sequents can then be used to model individual worlds of the countermodel because they contain enough information to guarantee Boolean values required from the countermodel. For intuitionistic modal logics, however, it can happen that saturation is never achieved, that invertible rules can be applied indefinitely. Thus, instead of only using a non-invertible rule once the saturation is reached, the same non-invertible rule has to be used at every stage of partial saturation. Intuitively, the saturated state is achieved after at most countably many applications of invertible rules and the non-invertible rule is applied to the resulting "(possibly infinite) nested sequent." Formally, we consider infinitely many saturation stages of the sequent, where saturation stages of the same sequent node are connected by the correspondence relation ≈. For each equivalence class with respect to ≈, the saturated state is simply the limit over all individual instances from the class, and the non-invertible rule operates on these saturated equivalent classes. In order to synchronize different individual applications of non-invertible rules, we use the notion of level.
We distinguish three types of unary rules: In contrast to the soundness proof, we now distinguish between nodes in the premise and conclusion of the rule, which necessitates the following If γ ≈ δ, we also say that γ and δ are corresponding.
Clearly, ≈ is an equivalence relation. It is easy to see that distinct nodes of the same sequent occurrence cannot be corresponding. For a sequent node γ ∈ and a sequent occurrence we denote by γ the unique sequent node of corresponding to γ (if it exists). If γ is the parent of δ in tr( ) and both γ and δ exist for some sequent occurrence , then γ is the parent of δ in tr( ). Clearly, rule correspondence is also an equivalence relation.
Definition 5.9 (Rule transfer) Let r be a rule instance and be the conclusion of a corresponding rule instance. We denote the first premise of this corresponding rule instance by prem r ( ) and, in case of binary rules, the second premise by prem r ( ).
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition:
Lemma 5.10 (Corresponding rules for superior sequents) Let be the conclusion of a rule instance r and be a superior of .
• If r is not node-creating, then is the conclusion of a corresponding rule instance and prem r ( ) prem r ( ) (also prem r ( ) prem r ( ) for binary rules).
• If r is node-creating, then either 1. a corresponding rule instance has already been used on the path from ϒ to and prem r ( ) , or 2.
is the conclusion of a corresponding rule instance and prem r ( ) prem r ( ).
In the former case, we define prem r ( ) := to unify the notation.
In the following, we use G to denote an arbitrary subset of the set of sequent occurrences in T. We write G ⊆ T if all occurrences are taken from T. For binary rules, we use prem r (G) for the second premises.
Lemma 5.14 (Properties of confluent sets) Let the set G ⊆ T be confluent, and let prem r be a rule instance with conclusion in G. This demonstrates that prem r (G) is confluent. For a non-leveling r, take two sequents from G ∪ prem r (G). If both belong to G or both belong to prem r (G), the two sequents have a superior in the same set by its confluence. If ∈ G and prem r ( ) ∈ prem r (G), then there is a superior , in G by its confluence. By Lemma 5.10, (12) holds again. Given that prem r ( ) because r is not a leveling rule, prem r ( ) ∈ prem r (G) is a superior of both and prem r ( ).
2. Follows from Clause 1 and the maximality of G. 3. We prove that either prem r (G) ⊆ T or prem r (G) ⊆ T by contradiction. Otherwise, there would have been , ∈ G such that prem r ( ) and prem r ( ) are both derivable. For a superior , , which would have existed by the confluence of G, both prem r ( ) and prem r ( ) would have been derivable by admissibility of weakening (Lemma 3.11), making ∈ G ⊆ T derivable by r, in contradiction to our assumptions. Whichever of prem r (G) or prem r (G) is within T must be confluent (and contained in G for maximal confluent sets) as in Clause 1. [γ ] G ∈ VĜ for any node γ from ∈ G, it remains to note that there is a path from ρ to γ in tr( ) and that ρ ≈ ρ. Further, it is easy to show that for γ ≈ δ with γ from a sequent ∈ G and δ from a sequent ∈ G, the path from ρ to γ has the same length as the path from ρ to δ. In other words, each edge inĜ increases the minimal distance from the root (in each member sequent), which prevents directed cycles.
Finally, we show that each node inĜ has at most one parent. Indeed, assume
This means that γ is the parent of δ and γ is the parent of δ for some sequent occurrences and from the confluent set G. They must have a superior ∈ G. Since all nodes δ ≈ δ ≈ δ , and γ ≈ γ , and γ ≈ γ exist by superiority of and since both γ and γ must coincide with the unique parent of δ in tr( ), it follows that γ = γ and, consequently, γ ≈ γ . In other words, [γ ] 
Note that this model construction is a distant relative of the canonical models. Indeed, the structure of the proof-search tree is almost completely ignored: only levels are used to prevent maximal confluent sets from reaching over leveling rules. We use the completeness of the (infinite) proof search to demonstrate the properties of maximal confluent trees, there is no direct translation of rule applications in the proof search to the accessibility relation in the model.
Lemma 5.18 (Input formula preservation)
Proof The statement for ≤ follows from that for ≤ 0 . Assume
for some ∈ G and 2. for some conclusion ∈ G and premise ∈ H of a leveling-rule instance prem r with prem r (G) ⊆ H we have γ ≈ δ .
By confluence of G, there is a superior to both and . We have A • ∈ γ ⊆ γ and prem r ( ) ∈ prem r (G) ⊆ H. Thus, A • ∈ γ prem r ( ) . Since and , would be derivable due to both a • , a • ∈ γ , whereas the confluent G must contain a non-derivable superior of and . 
Case

Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a multiple-conclusion calculus for all intuitionistic modal logics in the intuitionistic S5-cube, using nested sequents. The observation made by Egly and Schmitt [8] , that multiple conclusion calculi for intuitionistic logic can provide exponentially shorter proofs than single-conclusion calculi, does also apply to our case, which makes our calculi interesting for possible applications in proof search.
